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Abstract
A dramatic development in e-commerce has been made in the past decade. For cus-
tomers shopping online, other customers’ review is an important source of information.
There are already studies finding that product with good review can have higher de-
mand. However, a review may be subjective and even a good quality product may still
have low rating reviews. These negative reviews could be a problem when a seller just
starts the business with only a few reviews, in which case a negative review will drag
the average review significantly. It could be a seller’s nightmare in a highly competitive
market since customers will be unwilling to purchase a product with negative reviews
whatever the quality is. To resolve this issue, the seller could simply lower the price to
attract more purchases and get more reviews. However, keeping a low price may hurt
the profit in the short run.
In this dissertation, we study the trade off between using a low price to attract more
purchases and more reviews, and using a high price for a higher profit. We consider a
monopolist selling a single product to a sequence of customers. Each customer will make
a purchase decision based on the current review and the price. If a customer purchases
the product, he will post a review, which is drawn from a normal distribution centered
at the true quality. Only the seller knows the true quality, therefore, the customers have
to use the review as a reference of the true quality. We derive the optimal policy on
how the seller should adjust the price to maximize the expected revenue. We also derive
upper bounds on the best performance of any policy and further extend the results to
multiple price policies. After that, we then consider a discrete model where the review
distribution can be a general distribution under some mild assumptions. The results
of this dissertation highlight the trade off between short term and long term revenue,
iv
provide insights on how to design a good pricing policy and enable sellers to make a
better decision.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past several years, e-commerce has developed dramatically. In 2013, US e-
commerce sales were 263 billion dollars, accounting for only 5.8% of the total retail sales
in that year [1]. In 2018, US e-commerce sales grew to 513 billion dollars, accounting for
9.7% of total retail sales [2]. The growth of e-commerce in China is even more dramatic.
The online retail sales soared from 270 billion dollars in 2013 [3] to 1 trillion dollars in
2017 [4].
For a consumer, the main advantage of buying products online is convenience. In-
stead of having to drive to a store and wait in a queue for checking out, consumers can
click their mouse to make an order 24/7 at home. E-commerce also benefits the sellers
significantly, for it gives them access to a much larger market at a low operational cost.
For the entire society, it lowers the market entry barrier and enhances competition, thus
increasing social welfare.
When shopping online, it may be sometimes difficult for customers to evaluate the
quality of a product just based on the descriptions listed by the seller. One reason is
the lack of credibility. Few sellers will admit the flaw of their products. It is often
the case that a customer gets a product that does not match the description online or
1
2even a fake one. In this case, the customer has to either spend much time and effort
to return the product or accept the loss. Another reason is that the description online
is not informative enough. For example, sellers sometimes use quantitative parameters
to describe their products. Although it is necessary to have some quantitative mea-
surements, customers may have no sense of the numbers at all. For example, a camera
producer may market their product as a portable camera with the detail parameters of
its size, weight and battery life, while what customers really want to know is if it fits in
a sports bag, if it is easy to carry for hiking or if it is necessary to prepare some backup
batteries.
Facing such a situation, customers tend to refer to other buyers’ review to estimate
the true quality of the product. Indeed, reviews play an important role for online
customers to make a purchase decision. According to a survey [5], a restaurant can get
5 – 9% revenue increment if its Yelp rating gets one extra star. However, a review is
usually a personal opinion which varies from one to another, even for the same product.
For example, many high rating products on Amazon.com still have 1-star or 2-star
reviews. These low reviews could be more problematic for a newly-launched product
with only a few reviews, in which case a low rating review will drag the average review
down significantly. In a highly competitive market, this could be a disaster for the seller
since customers will be deterred to buy the product whatever the actual product quality
is. In this case, should there be more purchases, the review will be likely to go back to a
higher level. However, the dilemma is that without a good review, there would probably
be no more purchases. One solution, in this case, is to make the price lower. With some
discounts, the seller may be able to attract more purchases from the customers, which
hopefully will reinstate the review to a good level. However, keeping a low price too
long may hurt the profit of the seller. In this dissertation, we are interested in the trade
off between using a low price to lure customers into purchasing the product and writing
3reviews and using a high price for a higher profit. In particular, we would like to answer
the following questions:
(1) How should a seller set the price when considering the customer review effect?
Should the seller give a discount at the beginning?
(2) If the seller can set multiple prices during the selling season, what is the value
of the flexibility of using more prices?
(3) What is the value of adaptively adjusting prices based on the current review,
compared with predetermining prices?
(4) How does the review distribution influence the result? Is there a significant
difference if the customer rate the item with one to five stars instead of just a click of
“like” or “dislike”?
To answer these questions, we consider a monopolist selling a single product to a
sequence of customers. Only the seller knows the true quality of the product initially.
However, each customer who buys the product will leave a review drawn from a normal
distribution centered at the true quality. Subsequent customers use the current review
score as an estimation of the true quality of the product. A customer’s utility is the
difference between the estimated quality and price. When a new customer arrives, if
his utility is positive, he will purchase the product and leave a new review. Otherwise,
the customer will leave without a purchase. In our model, the product’s review is a
simple average of all the previous review scores. There will also be an initial review
score indicating the initial impression of this product. The seller’s goal is to maximize
his expected revenue.
Under this model, we consider different types of pricing policies.
• A fixed two-price policy. In the fixed two-price policy, the seller has to determine
the prices he will use, and a switching time. All these decisions must be made at
the beginning of the sales period. This policy is commonly used by restaurants
4and hotels. For example, when a new restaurant or hotel opens, it will offer some
discount to customers. The discount expires after a certain period after which
a normal price will be used. Also, all the information will be announced at the
beginning.
• A fixed multi-price policy. In this policy, the seller can use multiple prices. All
the prices and switching times have to be predetermined.
• A partially adaptive policy. In this policy, the seller only announces the switching
times at the beginning of the sales. All the prices (except for the first price) can be
determined adaptively at the switching time. This gives the seller some flexibility
in adjusting the price.
• A fully adaptive two-price policy. In the fully adaptive two-price policy, the seller
has maximum flexibility. He only needs to decide the first price at the beginning
of the sales and can switch to the second price at any time. The second price is
also determined adaptively based on the review level at the switching time.
For any policy, we evaluate the performance by “regret”, which is the difference between
the expected revenue of the policy and the optimal revenue if the customer knows the
true quality of the product at the beginning (we will give a formal definition later). For
the fixed two-price policy, we provide a policy that has a sublinear regret. We also prove
that our proposed policy achieves the best regret asymptotically. The policy consists of
a low initial price and a subsequent high price with a sublinear switching time, which
means most of the time is spent on the second price. This is consistent with the real
world practice, where a seller will give some discounts at the beginning and switch to
the normal price after customers become familiar with the product. We then extend our
result to the fixed multi-price case. We show that as the number of prices increases, the
regret converges to the square root of the duration of the sales. After that, we show that
5the partially adaptive policy has the same order of regret as the predetermined fixed
price policy, which means the extra flexibility on pricing does not have a significant
value. Finally, we consider the fully adaptive two-price policy and prove it still has the
same regret as the regret of the fixed two-price policy, which means the flexibility on
the switching time does not help neither.
In addition to the model where customers give reviews based on a normal distri-
bution, we also consider a discrete model, in which customers come at a discrete time
with a general review distribution. We show that no matter what review metric the
customers are using, five stars, ten stars, or “like” and “dislike”, our analysis still holds.
The rest of the dissertation is organized in the following way: Chapter 2 reviews
related literature. Chapter 3 discusses the basic setting of the model and studies the
performance of different policies. Chapter 4 considers a discrete model. We conclude
the dissertation and point out some future research directions in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this section, we review related literature. Our work falls into the field of revenue
management. Revenue management is a filed that concerns using disciplined tactics to
optimize sales decisions (including product availability, prices, etc) to increase revenue
growth of firms. It first arose from the airline industry, where airlines started adjusting
fares to increase their revenue. For example, to win over customers from its competitors,
American Airlines provided a low fare to those flights predicted to have empty seats
with a requirement of advanced purchasing and non-refunding [6]. Later, the hospitality
industry also adopted the idea of adjusting the price based on the inventory level, for
it shared a similar business model with advanced booking and perishable inventory [7].
From there revenue management started to become a common practice and has been
widely applied across various industries. At the heart of revenue management is the
ability to provide different prices to customers with different level of willingness to pay.
We refer readers to find more details about revenue management in [8], [9] and [10].
There is a growing research interest in revenue management in customer behavior,
in which the purchase decision is not only determined by the current price but also
by some other factors. For example, [11] propose the multinomial logit choice model
6
7(MNL), where customers choose between multiple alternatives. [12] first apply the MNL
model in the context of revenue management. They study the assortment problem that
what product set should be offered to maximize the revenue and derive the structure of
the optimal policy. [13] consider the cross-selling problem where a customer can choose
between the requested item and a package including the requested item. [14] study the
inventory control problem when a customer can choose between flights with the same
origin and destination. [15] discuss the spiral-down effect when the seller ignored the
customers’ strategic behavior of choosing a lower fare product. [16] study a model that
a customer’s utility is influenced by past prices. [17] consider patient customers who
can wait for the best price. [18] study the case where customers’ utility is based on
other people’s usage of the product in his network. In this work, we study the pricing
policy when there is a customer review effect.
The effect of customer review is part of the “word of mouth” effect. There is plenty
of related literature on the effect of customer review in marketing. One area is the
empirical study of how customer review influences sales. For example, [19] examine
the relationship between box office revenue and its review. They argue that it is the
number of the review, rather than the review itself plays an important role. [20] study
the relation between book sales and its review on different online shopping platforms.
They show that an increase in the review score can lead to an increase in the sales.
[21] show that the number of blogs or posts showing an intention of purchasing before
the release of a product is vital to the final sales. [22] study the influence of customer
review on the sales of DVD players and find that while customer review has a substantial
impact on the sales for those weak brands (not recognized by customers), it does not
have a substantial impact on the sales of strong brands (famous brands with a good
reputation). [23] study the relationship between the digital camera and its review. They
find that for a high-involvement product, for which customers do some research before
8making a purchase decision, it is the review on external websites, not the review on
the website that sells the digital camera that have a significant impact on the sales. In
contrast to those empirical works, in this dissertation, we focus on how the seller should
set the prices when aware of the review effect.
Our work is also related to dynamic pricing. As a way of price discrimination,
dynamic pricing is often used to optimize revenue when the demand function is changing
over time. [24] study the case when customers’ arrival is based on a Poisson Process
and the goods are perishable. They derive structural properties and get a closed-form
solution when the demand satisfies some conditions. [25] consider a similar problem,
but the price can only be chosen from a discrete set. They show the structure of the
optimal policy and derive the closed-form solution. [26] consider a dynamic pricing
problem across different products. They give a closed-form solution when the demand
is deterministic and lower and upper bounds when the demand is stochastic. [27] study
the dynamic pricing problem when the demand is not homogeneous. They show that
the optimal price changes monotonically as the inventory level goes down. In our work,
customers’ willingness to pay changes as the review score changes. Therefore there is a
need for dynamic pricing to optimize the revenue.
Besides price discrimination, another reason for using dynamic pricing is demand
learning. The seller has to dynamically adjust the price to collect information about the
demand when it is not fully revealed. One class of such study is to assume the demand
function follows a specific parametric form. [28] first study the performance of iterative
least square method (ILS). In the ILS, demand is a linear function of the price. The
seller uses least square estimation to estimate the parameters, then uses myopic optimal
price every step based on the estimated parameters. They show this strategy has an
O(T ) regret, where T is the length of the selling period. [29] provide a strategy in fixed
length price cycles. In each cycle, the seller first uses two test prices then switches to
9a myopic best price. The time spent on test prices is exponentially decreasing cycle by
cycle. Moreover, they prove that under this strategy, the regret is O(
√
T ). They also
prove that for any policy, there are instances where the regret is Ω(
√
T ). [30] extend
the work to multi-product setting and prove a much broader class of strategies that
achieve the best regret order. They also consider the case where the seller knows the
expected demand under some price. In this case, the regret of ILS is O(log T ). [31]
consider a variant of the problem, in which the true demand function is one of the two
known functions to the seller. The seller has a prior belief of the distribution of the
demand being each of the known function and updates that belief every step. They
provide a policy and a comprehensive analysis of its regret. Another class of learning
problems is non-parametric learning, which does not assume a parametric form of the
demand function. [32] study a strategy that first considers a set of candidate prices,
then tests the performance of each price in the learning phase, and finally uses the best
price for the remaining time. They show that this strategy has a regret of O(T 1/4).
[33] further improve the result by providing a new dynamic learning strategy achieving
O(T 1/2) regret. Because of the randomness of the demand function in our setting, some
methods are similar with demand learning problems. However, in our work, it is the
customers who learn the quality of the product.
Finally, there are several papers that consider the pricing problem with review effect.
For example, similar to our paper [34] also consider a pricing problem for the seller when
customers use review to infer the quality of the product. However, in their setting, the
review is related to both the quality of the product and its price. In our setting, the
review only depends on the quality of the product. [35] also study a pricing problem
under review effect. They assume that the review is drawn from a normal distribution,
centered at the true quality of the product and only the seller knows the true quality.
The main difference is that in their work, the customers utility function is stochastic,
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which means there is always a positive probability for a customer to buy the product
regardless of the current price and review. This ensures that the learning process will
continue, and customers will learn the true quality of the product eventually. Moreover,
they simplify the model by converting the problem to a deterministic problem, using
the probability of purchase as the demand rate and customers will always post the same
review score. While in our setting, the utility function is deterministic, which means
the learning process may stop under specific price and review unless the seller changes
the price. This imposes additional constraints to the seller, and therefore the seller
has to be more conservative about pricing. Another difference is that in their model
customers use a Bayesian method to update their belief, while in our model customers
use the simple average review score, which is commonly used on major online shopping
websites. These differences lead to different results between our model and theirs.
Chapter 3
Continuous Model
In this chapter we introduce the basic model setting and discuss various policies. Con-
sider a seller that sells one product to a sequence of customers in a discrete time horizon
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T . The product has a mean quality of q and for each customer
who purchases this product, he will experience a valuation of the product drawn from
a normal distribution N(q, σ2). We assume that only the seller knows q and σ but not
the customers.
In our model, we assume that at each time period, there is a review score for this
product which affects the purchase decision of customers. In particular, we use qt to
denote the current review score at time period t, then we assume that the customer’s
utility of purchasing the product is ut = qt − p where p is the price in that period.
If ut is positive, then the customer will purchase the product, in which case he will
leave a review with the true valuation rt he experienced (drawn from N(q, σ
2)). In our
model, we assume that the review score is the average of all past reviews. Therefore,
the average review for the product in the next period will be
qt+1 =
tqt + rt
t+ 1
.
11
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In our model, we assume that the starting time is t0 and the initial review level at t0 is
q0. One can view that this initial set of reviews are obtained by some die-hard customers
that will buy and review the products anyway. They could also be professional product
reviewers. Given the above-defined dynamics, we have the review at time t must follow:
tqt = t0q0 + rt0+1 + rt0+2 + · · ·+ rt,
where rt0+1, . . . , rt ∼ N(q, σ2). To simplify the discussion, we consider a diffusion
approximation of the above process. In particular, we use a Brownian motion to replace
the sum of normal random variables. Let Gt be the approximate total review level at
time t. Starting from (t0, q0), Gt is a Brownian motion with drift:
Gt = t0q0 + q(t− t0) + σBt−t0 , t ≥ t0,
where Bs is a standard Brownian motion. Obviously, when the review process Gt falls
below pt, customers will no longer purchase the product, and the sales stop until the
seller switches to another price. The seller’s goal is to maximize his expected revenue.
We use pi to denote a non-anticipating policy, in which a price to be used at time t is
determined only by the history information {Gs, s ≤ t}. Denote JT (pi) the expected
revenue of the seller using policy pi. In this chapter we will focus on four policies
• A fixed two-price policy. The seller can use at most two prices during the sales.
He needs to determind the two prices he will use and the time to swithc the price
beforehand.
• A fixed multi-price policy. The seller can set multiple prices. All the prices and
swithcing times have to be predetermined.
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• A partially adaptive policy. In this policy, only the switching times are predeter-
minded. The seller can decide all the prices (except the first one) adaptively at
the switching time.
• A fully adaptive two-price policy. In this policy, only the first price is pretermined.
The seller can switch to the second price at any time. The second price is also
determined adaptively
Note that if the customers know the true quality q in the beginning, then the seller will
set a price p = q for the entire selling season, and the revenue until time T , will be
q(T − t0). Therefore, we define the regret of the seller when using policy pi by
RT (pi) = q · (T − t0)− JT (pi).
The seller’s goal is to minimize his regret.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we discuss a fixed
two-price policy. In Section 3.2, we consider a fixed multi-price policy. Those are all
fixed price policies, where the seller has to specify all the policy details at the start of
the sales. In Section 3.3, we discuss some adaptive policies, in which the seller does not
need to decide everything in the beginning of the sales.
3.1 Fixed Two-Price Case
We first consider a case in which the seller can set at most two prices during the entire
selling horizon. The seller’s policy consists of an initial price p1, a stopping time t1
adapted to the process Gt and a second price p2 which is a function of the history of Gt
before t1.
Consider a fixed two-price policy, in which the switching time t1 and the second
14
price p2 are chosen in advance rather than determined adaptively based on the process
Gt. To be more precise, in a fixed price policy pit1,p1,p2 , the price p1 is used from t0 until
t1 or when the sales stop, whichever comes first. Then the seller switches the price to
p2 at t1. We call [t0, t1] the first period and [t1, T ] the second period.
Now we analyze the performance of this policy. Let τ1 = inf{t : Gt < p1t} ∧ t1 be
the time the sales stop during the first period. Similarly, let τ2 = inf{t : Gt < p2t, t ≥
τ1} ∧ (τ1 + T − t1) be the time the sales stop during the second period.
With the above notations, we represent the seller’s revenue for policy pit1,p1,p2 until
time T as:
JT (pit1,p1,p2) = Eτ [p1(τ1 − t0) + p2(τ2 − τ1)].
The regret for a fixed two-price policy is
RT (pit1,p1,p2) = q · (T − t0)− JT (pit1,p1,p2).
Next, we show that by properly choosing the parameters t1, p1 and p2, one can achieve
an asymptotically optimal revenue (or equivalently, a sublinear regret). We have the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. Let t1 = T
2/3, p1 = − log T and p2 = q−T−1/3 log T . Then RT (pit1,p1,p2) =
O(T 2/3 log T ).
Before we prove this theorem, we make a few comments. One may notice that p1 is
negative in the statement of Theorem 1. This is because we assume the review of each
customer follows a normal distribution. If we restrict p1 to be positive, then there is a
constant probability that the sales terminate in the first period, in which case the regret
would be O(T ) (one can see the detail of this argument in the proof of Theorem 2). In
practice, the review of products are usually positive (for example a number between 0
15
and 10). In such a case, the seller can just set p1 = 0 to make sure that the sales can
continue, and Theorem 1 would also hold. We will discuss this case in detail in Chapter
4. The general idea of the policy matches what we have seen in the real practice, that a
seller provides a promotion (a low price) in the beginning of the sales for a short period,
and then switches to a normal price for the rest of the sales horizon.
Proof. Recall that
JT (pit1,p1,p2) = Eτ1,τ2 [p1(τ1 − t0) + p2(τ2 − τ1)].
Since p1 = − log T < 0 and τ1 ≤ t1, we have
p1 · Eτ [t1 ∧ τ − t0] ≥ p1(t1 − t0).
Similarly, since p2 > 0, Eτ1,τ2 [τ2 − τ1] ≥ (T − t1)P(τ2 = τ1 + T − t1), we have
p2 · Eτ1,τ2 [τ2 − τ1] ≥ p2 · (T − t1)P(τ2 = τ1 + T − t1).
In the following, we denote A1 = {τ1 < t1} and A2 = {τ2 < τ1 + T − t1}. Therefore
A1 ∪A2 = {τ2 < T}. And we have:
JT (pit1,p1,p2) ≥ p1(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1) · P(τ2 = T )
= p1(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1) · (1− P(A1 ∪A2))
≥ p1(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1) · (1− P(A1)− P(A2)).
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Therefore,
RT (pit1,p1,p2) = q(T − t0)− JT (pit1,p1,p2)
≤ q(T − t0)− [p1(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1)(1− P(A1)− P(A2))]
= (q − p2)T + (p2 − p1)t1 + p2(T − t1)P(A1) + p2(T − t1)P(A2)− (q − p1)t0
≤ (q − p2)T + (p2 − p1)t1 + p2TP(A1) + p2TP(A2). (1.1)
In the following, we will bound each of the four terms in (1.1). For the first term, by
the definition of p2, we have
(q − p2) · T = T 2/3 log T.
For the second term, we have
(p2 − p1)t1 = (q − T−1/3 log T ) · T 2/3 + T 2/3 log T = O(T 2/3 log T ).
For the third term, by Lemma 7, we have:
P(A1) ≤ P(∪t0≤t≤∞{Gt ≤ p1t}) = exp
(
−2(q − p1)(q0 − p1)t0
σ2
)
≤ exp
(
−2t0 log
2 T
σ2
)
.
Therefore, when T ≥ exp(σ2/2t0), P(A1) ≤ 1/T . Thus p2TP(A1) = O(1).
For the last term, we first bound P(A2). Conditioning P(A2) on the realization of
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Gt1 , we have:
P(A2) =
∫
y
P(A2|Gt1 = y)P(Gt1 = y)dy
≤ Φ
(
p2t1 − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
+
∫ ∞
p2t1
1
σ
√
t1 − t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
exp
(
−2(q − p2)(y − p2t1)
σ2
)
dy.
(1.2)
where φ(x) = 1√
2pi
exp(−12x2) and Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞ φ(y)dy are the density and cumulative
distribution function for standard normal distribution. Here the first term corresponds
to the case where Gt1 ≤ p2t1 and the second term uses the fact that because of Lemma
7,
P(A2|Gt1 = y) = exp(−2(q − p2)(y − p2t1)/σ2).
For the first term in (1.2), we note that when T is sufficiently large,
p2t1 − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0) = −T 1/3 log T + (q − q0)t0 < 0.
Therefore, by the fact that for any x < 0, Φ(x) ≤ 1√
2pi|x| exp(−x2/2) [36] , we have:
Φ
(
p2t1 − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
≤ σT
1/3
√
2pi(T 1/3 log T − (q − q0)t0)
exp
(
−(T
1/3 log T − (q − q0)t0)2
2σ2(T 2/3 − t0)
)
.
When T is large,
σT 1/3√
2pi(T 1/3 log T − (q − q0)t0)
≤ 1 and − (T
1/3 log T − (q − q0)t0)2
2σ2(T 2/3 − t0)
≤ − log T.
18
Thus,
Φ
(
p2t1 − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
= O
(
1
T
)
.
For the second term in (1.2), we have:
∫ ∞
p2t1
exp
(
−2(q − p2)(y − p2t1)
σ2
)
1
σ
√
t1 − t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
dy
= exp
(
−2(q − p2)(q0 − p2)t0
σ2
)
∗
∫ ∞
p2t1
1√
2piσ
√
t1 − t0
exp
(
−(y − q0t0 − q(t1 − t0) + 2(q − p2)(t1 − t0))
2
2σ2(t1 − t0)
)
dy
= exp
(
−2(q − p2)(q0 − p2)t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
(q − p2)(t1 − t0)− (q0 − p2)t0
σ
√
t1 − t0
)]
= exp
(
−2(q − p2)(q0 − p2)t0
σ2
)
Φ
(
(q0 − p2)t0 − (q − p2)(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
,
When T is sufficiently large, −2(q − p2)(q0 − p2)t0/σ2 ≤ 2q(q0 + q)t0/σ2 and (q0 −
p2)t0− (q− p2)(t1− t0) = q0t0− qt0 + 2T−1/3 log Tt0− T 1/3 log T < 0. Again, we apply
that when x < 0, Φ(x) ≤ 1√
2pi|x| exp(−x2/2). We have
Φ
(
(q0 − p2)t0 − (q − p2)(t1 − t0)
σ
√
t1 − t0
)
≤ σT
1/3
√
2pi(T 1/3 log T − 2T−1/3 log T − q0t0 + qt0)
exp
(
−(T 1/3 log T − 2T−1/3 log T − q0t0 + qt0)2
2σ2(T 2/3 − t0)
)
.
When T is large,
σT 1/3√
2pi(T 1/3 log T − 2T−1/3 log T − q0t0 + qt0)
≤ 1,
−(T 1/3 log T − 2T−1/3 log T − q0t0 + qt0)2
2σ2(T 2/3 − t0)
≤ − log T.
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Thus, we have proved that P(A2) = O( 1T ) and by combining these four terms, we have:
RT (pit1,p1,p2) = O(T
2/3 log T ).
Next, we will show that a regret of O(T 2/3) is the best one can do among all fixed
two-price policies. We first introduce a lemma to bound the expected stopping time for
a single price policy.
Lemma 1. Let τp = inf{t : Gt < pt, t ≥ t0} ∧ T . For any T > 0, if p ≤ q0, then
Eτp [τp − t0]
≤ (T − t0)
[
1− exp
(
−2(q0 − p)(q − p)t0
σ2
)]+
+
4(q0 − p)t0
σ
min
(
1, exp
(
−2(q0 − p)(q − p)t0
σ2
))√
T − t0.
If p > q0, then Eτp [τp − t0] = 0.
Proof. Let a = (q0 − p)t0/σ, b = (q − p)/σ. Applying Lemma 8 we have when p ≤ q0,
Eτp [τp − t0] ≤ (T − t0)[1− exp(−2ab)]+ + 4amin{1, exp(−2ab)}
√
T − t0.
Thus the lemma holds.
With Lemma 1, we can now bound the revenue generated after switching the price.
Lemma 2. Denote Gt = t0q0 + q(t− t0) +σBt−t0 , t ≥ t0. Let τp,s = inf{t : Gt < pt, t ≥
s}∧(T−s) and S = q(T−s)−pEτp,s [τp,s−s]. For any T > 0,  > 0, if p > q+T−(1/2−)
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and s ≥ T 1−, then
S = Ω(T − s),
if s ≤ T 1−,
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s− t0
)
.
Lemma 2 shows the relationship between the switching time and the regret. The
seller will have at least Ω(T/
√
t) regret if he switches the price at t. The intuition is
that, the standard deviation for Gt1 at time t1 is σ
√
t1. To make sure the sale process
continues, the price should satisfy q − p2 = Ω(log Tt−1/21 ) at time t. Otherwise, if
p2 >= q − σ/
√
t1, the sales will stop at t1 with a constant probability. With the above
two lemmas, we state the second theorem to bound the total regret of a general fixed
two-price policy.
Theorem 2. For any fixed two-price policy pit1,p1,p2, RT (pit1,p1,p2) = Ω(T
2/3).
Theorem 2 shows that our policy in Theorem 1 achieves the best regret order. The
proof first bounds the regret for the first price, which is linear in the switching time.
This is mainly because if the seller charges a high first price when the process just starts,
the sales have a high probability to stop since the initial review q0 and t0 are constants.
To reduce the risk, the seller has to set a low price thus leading to a linear regret.
The next step is to use Lemma 2 to bound the regret in the second period. If the
switching time is sublinear to T , we can directly use Lemma 2 to bound the regret. On
the other hand, if the switching time is close to T , then the regret in the first period
will be high since it is linear on the switching time. Combining the two cases we can
prove the theorem.
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Proof. The revenue of a fixed two-price policy pit1,p1,p2 is
JT (pit1,p1,p2) = Eτ1,τ2 [p1(τ1 − t0) + p2(τ2 − τ1)].
Therefore,
RT (pit1,p1,p2) =q(T − t0)− JT (pip1,p2,t1)
≥ q(t1 − t0)− p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+ q(T − t1)− p2Eτ1,τ2 [τ2 − τ1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
,
We first bound S1. We consider four possible cases.
1. If p1 ≤ 0, then p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0] ≤ 0, and S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0).
2. If p1 ≥ q0, then p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0] = 0, and S1 = q(t1 − t0).
3. If 0 ≤ p1 ≤ min(q, q0), then by Lemma 1,
p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0)] ≤ q(t1 − t0)[1− exp(−2q0qt0/σ2)] +
4qq0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0,
and thus
S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0) exp(−2q0qt0/σ2)− 4qq0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0.
4. If q < p1 ≤ q0, then by Lemma 1,
p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0] ≤
4p1(q0 − p1)t0
σ
√
t1 − t0 ≤ q
2
0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0,
and
S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0)− q
2
0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0.
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Therefore in all cases, S1 = Ω(t1). Now let’s consider S2,
S2 = q(T − t1)− p2Eτ1,τ2 [τ2 − τ1] = Eτ1 [q(T − t1)− p2Eτ2 [τ2 − τ1|τ1]].
If p2 ≤ q + T−3/8 and t1 ≥ T 7/8,
S2 ≥ q(T − t1)− (q + T−3/8)(T − t1) ≥ −T 5/8, S1 = Ω(t1) = Ω(T 7/8).
The total regret is Ω(T 7/8).
Let  = 1/8, from lemma 2, if p2 ≥ q + T−3/8 and t1 ≥ T 7/8,
S2 = Eτ1 [Ω(T − τ1)] ≥ Ω(T − t1).
The total regret is
S1 + S2 = Ω(t1) + Ω(T − t1) = Ω(T ).
If t1 < T
7/8, from Lemma 2, we have
S2 = Eτ1
[
Ω
(
T − t1√
τ1 − t0
)]
≥ Ω
(
T − t1√
t1 − t0
)
.
In this case,
RT (pip1,p2,t1) = S1 + S2 ≥ Ω(t1 − t0) + Ω
(
T − t1√
t1 − t0
)
≥ c1(t1 − t0) + c2(T − t1)
2
√
t1 − t0 +
c2(T − t1)
2
√
t1 − t0
≥
[
c1c
2
2(T − t1)2
4
]1/3
= Ω(T 2/3).
23
To summarize, in this section we provide a fixed two-price policy with a sublinear
regret O(T 2/3 log T ). We also prove this policy achieves the best performance asymp-
totically for any fixed two-price policy.
3.2 Fixed Multi-Price Case
Theorem 2 proves all the fixed two-price policy have a regret of Ω(T 2/3/ log T ). The
question then arises: how can we do better? Since the main cause of the regret is that
the price needs to follow q − p = Ω(log Tt−1/2), one obvious improvement is to let the
seller set a fixed multi-price policy so the price can keep increasing as the sales continues.
Such a policy is discussed in this session.
We consider a general setting where the seller can set K different prices instead
of two. We use piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK) to denote a fixed price policy in
which price pi is used from ti−1 to ti. We still use the notation τ0 = t0, tK = T ,
τi = inf{t : Gt < pit, t ≥ τi−1} ∧ (τi−1 + ti − ti−1).
Next we define the seller’s revenue for policy piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK).
We have
JT (piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK)) = Eτ
[
K∑
i=1
pi(τi − τi−1)
]
.
We also define the regret of a policy as
RT (piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK)) = qT−JT (piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK)).
Now we propose a policy in the K prices setting. Let ai =
1
2 +
1
2(2i−1) , i = 1, . . . ,K.
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p1 t1 p2 t2 p3 t3 p4 t4 Regret
K = 2 − log T T 23 q − log T/T 13 T N/A N/A N/A N/A O(T 23 log T )
K = 3 − log T T 47 q − log T/T 27 T 67 q − log T/T 37 T N/A N/A O(T 47 log T )
K = 4 − log T T 815 q − log T/T 415 T 45 q − log T/T 25 T 1415 q − log T/T 715 T O(T 815 log T )
Table 3.1: Illustrations of Policy pˆiT,k.
We define
pˆiT,K = piT,K(tˆ1, tˆ2, . . . , tˆK−1; pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆK),
where
tˆK = T, tˆi = tˆ
2/(1+2ai)
i+1 = tˆ
1−1/(2i+1−1)
i+1 , i = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 1, (2.3)
and
pˆ1 = − log T, pˆi = q − log T√
tˆi−1
, i = 2, . . . ,K.
We have the following result about pˆiT,K .
Theorem 3. RT (pˆiT,K) = O(T
aK log T ), for K ≥ 2.
Before we prove Theorem 3, we show some examples of pˆiT,K for different K in Table
3.1 to illustrate the algorithm. The regret decreases and converges to O(T 1/2 log T ) as
K increases.
One can see that in figure 3.1, in policy pˆiT,K , the seller updates the prices less
frequently toward the end of the selling horizon, and the price is closer and closer to q.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. In Theorem 1, we have already proved that
for K = 2, RT (pˆiT,2) = O(T
2/3 log T ), which is consistent with Theorem 3 for K = 2.
Suppose the result holds for K = k − 1, we now consider K = k.
In the following arguments, if not otherwise specified, the notation ti, pi, τi refer to
the time stamp, price and stopping time in the policy pˆiT,k.
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Figure 3.1: A Sample price path for a 4-price policy
The regret of pˆiT,k is:
RT (pˆiT,k) = qT − JT (pˆiT,k)
= qtk−1 − Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1) + Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1)− Jtk−1(pˆiT,k)
+ q(T − tk−1)− Eτpk(τK − τK−1),
where Jtk−1(pˆiT,k) = E[
∑k−1
i=1 pi(τi − τi−1)], that is, the revenue of pˆiT,k until tk−1.
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Similar with Theorem 1, we denote Ai = {τi < τi−1 + ti − ti−1}. And we have
RT (pˆiT,k) ≤ qtk−1 − Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1) + Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1)− Jtk−1(pˆiT,k)
+ q(T − tk−1)− pk(T − tk−1)
(
1−
k∑
i=1
P(Ai)
)
≤ qtk−1 − Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1) + Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1)− Jtk−1(pˆiT,k)
+ (q − pk)(T − tk−1) + qT
k∑
i=1
P(Ai).
For the first term, by induction, we have
qtk−1 − Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1) = O(tak−1k−1 log tk−1) = O(t
2ak−1/(1+2ak−1)
k log tk) = O(T
ak log T ),
where we use the fact that ak = 2ak−1/(1 + 2ak−1) by definition.
For the second term, by definition, we have
|Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1)− Jtk−1(pˆiT,k)|
≤
k−1∑
i=2
ti|(q − log tk−1/
√
ti−1)− (q − log T/
√
ti−1)|+ t1(log T − log tk−1)
=
k−1∑
i=2
ti log(T/tk−1)/
√
ti−1 + t1 log(T/tk−1).
By definition,
ti/
√
ti−1 = t
1−1/(1+2ai−1)
i = t
ai
i = t
2ai/(1+2ai)
i+1 = t
ai+1
i+1 = T
ak .
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Because a1 = 1, we also have t1 = t
a1
1 = T
ak . And by that tˆk−1 = T 1−1/(2
k−1),
log(T/tk−1) =
1
2k − 1 log T.
Combining the above argument, we have
|Jtk−1(pˆitk−1,k−1)− Jtk−1(pˆiT,k)| ≤
k
2k − 1 log T · T
ak = O(T ak log T ).
For the third term, by definition, we have
(q − pk)(T − tk−1) = O(T log T/
√
tk−1) = O(T 2ak−1/(1+2ak−1) log T ) = O(T ak log T ).
For the last term, we first bound P(Ai). By similar arguments as in (1.2), we have
P(Ai) =
∫
R
P(Ai|Gti−1 = y)P(Gti−1 = y)dy
≤ Φ
(
piti−1 − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
+
∫ ∞
piti−1
1
σ
√
ti−1 − t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
exp
(
−2(q − pi)(y − piti−1)
σ2
)
dy,
(2.4)
where the last inequality is because of Lemma 7 and that Ai ⊆ {Gt ≥ pit, for all t ≥
ti−1}. For the first term in (2.4), when T is sufficiently large,
piti−1 − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0) = −
√
ti−1 log T + (q − q0)t0 < 0.
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Now applying that when x < 0, Φ(x) ≤ 1√
2pi|x| exp(−x2/2), we have
Φ
(
piti−1 − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
≤ σ
√
ti−1√
2pi(
√
ti−1 log T − (q − q0)t0)
exp
(
−(
√
ti−1 log T − (q − q0)t0)2
2σ2(ti−1 − t0)
)
.
When T is large,
σ
√
ti−1√
2pi(
√
ti−1 log T − (q − q0)t0)
≤ 1 and − (
√
ti−1 log T − (q − q0)t0)2
2σ2(ti−1 − t0) ≤ − log T.
Thus,
Φ
(
piti−1 − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
= O
(
1
T
)
.
For the second term in (2.4), we have:
∫ ∞
piti−1
exp
(
−2(q − pi)(y − piti−1)
σ2
)
1
σ
√
ti−1 − t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
dy
= exp
(
−2(q − pi)(q0 − pi)t0
σ2
)
∗
∫ ∞
piti−1
1√
2piσ
√
ti−1 − t0
exp
(
−(y − q0t0 − q(ti−1 − t0) + 2(q − pi)(ti−1 − t0))
2
2σ2(ti−1 − t0)
)
dy
= exp
(
−2(q − pi)(q0 − pi)t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
(q − pi)(ti−1 − t0)− (q0 − pi)t0
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)]
= exp
(
−2(q − pi)(q0 − pi)t0
σ2
)
Φ
(
(q0 − pi)t0 − (q − pi)(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
.
When T is sufficiently large, −2(q − pi)(q0 − pi)t0/σ2 ≤ 2q(q0 + q)t0/σ2 and (q0 −
pi)t0 − (q − pi)(ti−1 − t0) = q0t0 − qt0 + 2 log Tt0/√ti−1 − √ti−1 log T < 0. Again, we
apply that when x < 0, Φ(x) ≤ 1√
2pi|x| exp(−x2/2). We have
Φ
(
(q0 − pi)t0 − (q − pi)(ti−1 − t0)
σ
√
ti−1 − t0
)
≤ σ
√
ti−1√
2pi(
√
ti−1 log T − 2 log T/√ti−1 − q0t0 + qt0)
exp
(−(√ti−1 log T − 2 log T/√ti−1 − q0t0 + qt0)2
2σ2(ti−1 − t0)
)
.
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When T is large,
σ
√
ti−1√
2pi(
√
ti−1 log T − 2 log T/√ti−1 − q0t0 + qt0)
≤ 1
−(√ti−1 log T − 2 log T/√ti−1 − q0t0 + qt0)2
2σ2(ti−1 − t0) ≤ − log T.
Thus, we have proved that P(Ai) = O( 1T ). Since k is fixed, qT
∑k
i=1 P(Ai) = O(1). By
combining these terms, we have:
RT (piT,k(t1, t2, . . . , tk−1; p1, p2, . . . , pk)) = O(T ak log T ).
Thus the theorem is proved.
Similar to Theorem 2, next we will show that a regret of O(T ak log T ) is the best
one can do.
Theorem 4. For any fixed price policy piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK), we have
RT (piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1, p2, . . . , pK)) = Ω(T aK ).
The theorem shows that our policy in Theorem 3 achieves the best regret rate. The
proof is completed by induction. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we call (t0, tk−1]
the first period and (tk−1, T ] the second period. In Theorem 2 we prove the regret of
the first period is Ω(t1), linear in the switching time. This is because the seller can only
use one price. While in the multiple price case, the regret of the first period is Ω(t
ak−1
k−1 ),
because the seller can set k − 1 prices in this period. This is the main cause of the
improvement compared with a fixed two-price policy. The regret of the second period
is still Ω(T/
√
tk−1), but since the regret for the first period decreases, the overall regret
decreases.
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Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. We already show that forK = 2, RT (pit1,p1,p2) =
Ω(T 2/3). Suppose the result holds for K = k − 1, we now consider K = k.
To simplify the discussion, we use piT,k to refer to a general fixed price policy with
k prices. We have
RT (piT,k) = qtk−1 − Jtk−1(piT,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+ q(T − tk−1)− pkEτk−1,τk [(τk − τk−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
.
For S1, by induction, we have
S1 = qtk−1 − Jtk−1(piT,k) = Ω(tak−1k−1 ).
Now consider the regret in the last period.
S2 = q(T − tk−1)−pkEτk−1,τk [(τk− τk−1)] = Eτk−1 [q(T − tk−1)−pkEτk [(τk− τk−1)|τk−1]].
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, now we consider three cases. Denote  be a small
positive number satisfying 0 <  < min{1 − ak/ak−1, ak−1 − 1/2}. If tk−1 > T 1−,
pk ≤ q + T−(1/2−),
S1 = Ω(t
ak−1
k−1 ) = Ω(T
ak), S2 ≥ −T−(1/2−)(T − tk−1) ≥ −T 1/2+.
Hence
S1 + S2 = Ω(T
ak).
From Lemma 2 we know, if tk−1 > T 1−, pk > q + T−(1/2−),
S2 = Eτk−1 [q(T − tk−1)− pkEτk [(τk − τk−1)|τk−1]] ≥ Eτk−1 [Ω(T − τk−1)] = Ω(T − tk−1).
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We have
S1 + S2 = Ω(t
ak−1
k−1 ) + Ω(T − tk−1) = Ω(T ak−1).
If t1 ≤ T 1−,
S2 = Eτk−1 [q(T−tk−1)−pkEτk [(τk−τk−1)|τk−1]] = Eτk−1
[
Ω
(
T − tk−1√
τi − t0
)]
= Ω
(
T − tk−1√
tk−1 − t0
)
.
Now we bound the regret,
RT (piT,k) = S1 + S2 ≥ Ω(tak−1k−1 ) + Ω
(
T − tk−1√
tk−1 − t0
)
≥ c1tak−1k−1 +
2ak−1c2(T − tk−1)
2ak−1
√
tk−1 − t0
≥
[
c1c
ak−1
2 (T − tk−1)2ak−1
22ak−1
]1/(2ak−1+1)
=
[
c1c
ak−1
2
22ak−1
]1/(2ak−1+1)
(T − tk−1)2ak−1/(1+2ak−1)
= Ω(T ak),
where the second inequality uses the fact that x+ 2ak−1y ≥ (xy2ak−1)1/(2ak−1+1) for all
x, y ≥ 0, and that ak−1 ≤ 1. And the last inequality uses that tk−1 ≤ T 1−. Thus the
theorem is proved.
Next we show some numerical results. In Figure 3.2, we choose q = 5, q0 = 5, t0 =
1, σ = 2. We plot the regret for T from 10000 to 200000 by increasing 10000 each
time. It shows the regret - T curve for fixed price policy with 2, 3 and 4 prices.
The regret increases sub-linearly. And the order of growth decreases when a policy
uses more prices. Table 3.2 shows the regression coefficient of the model log Regret =
β0 + β1 log(log T ) + β2 log T when T increases from 10
4 to 107. The result is very close
to our bound in Theorem 3.
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Figure 3.2: Regret for fixed price policy with 2, 3 and 4 prices
Number of prices Theorem 3 value β2
2 2/3 ≈ 0.667 0.671
3 4/7 ≈ 0.571 0.570
4 8/15 ≈ 0.533 0.526
Table 3.2: Coefficient Value
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To summarize, in this session we extend our analysis to the fixed multi-price policy,
where the seller can set multiple prices instead of two. We provide a fixed multi-price
policy with a regret of O(T ak log T ), where k is the number of prices the seller can use.
And ak is a decreasing sequence converging to 1/2. Therefore as the number of prices
increases, the regret converges to O(
√
T log T ). We also prove that a regret of Ω((T ak)
is the best the seller can achieve for any fixed k-price policy.
3.3 Adaptive Price Case
In previous sections, we considered fixed-price policies in which the prices and switching
times have to be determined beforehand. One may wonder if the performance of a policy
can be improved by relaxing the fixed price assumption. In this section, we investigate
into that direction by allowing the prices to be chosen adaptively based on the review
history (but the switching time still needs to be fixed). We call such pricing policies
partially adaptive policies. In the following, we study the optimal regret of such partially
adaptive policies.
3.3.1 Partially Adaptive Two-Price Case
In a partially adaptive two-price policy, the seller still picks the first price p1 and the
switching time t1. However, p2 can be decided adaptively when the seller switches the
price. Denote p∗2(x) = arg maxp pE[(τ2 − τ1)|Gτ1 = x], where the definitions of τ1, τ2, p1
are the same as before. We define the revenue and the regret of a partially adaptive
two-price policy pit1,p1 ,
JT (pit1,p1) = p1E[τ1 − t0] + EGτ1 [p∗2Eτ2 [τ2 − τ1|Gτ1 ]]
RT (pit1,p1) = q(T − t0)− JT (pit1,p1).
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Before stating the main result about the regret of the partially adaptive policy, we first
introduce two lemmas.
The first lemma shows that the majority of the trajectories of Gt can be bounded
by the curve qs+
√
s log T .
Lemma 3. The expected revenue of the trajectories in the set H = {Gt|Gs > qs +
√
s log T, ∃s ∈ [0, T ]} is neglectable.
E[R · 1(H)] = O(1).
To prove this, we split the sales horizon to many small intervals. Then we show that
the probability Gt hits the curve at one interval is very small, therefore the expected
revenue earned from those trajectories is also small. Summing the revenue over all the
intervals, the value is still neglectable.
Now that we prove the expected revenue earned from trajectories that hit the qs+
√
s log T curve is neglectable, we can bound the revenue by the adaptive policy, similar
to what we did in Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Denote Gt = t0q0 + q(t− t0) +σBt−t0 , t ≥ t0. Let τp,s = inf{t : Gt < pt, t ≥
s}∧ (T − s) and S = q(T − s)−p∗Eτp∗,s [τp∗,s− s], where p∗ = argmax pEτp,s [τp,s− s|Gs].
If s ≤ T 1−,
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s log T
)
.
We prove the theorem by showing that given Gs, whatever price the seller uses, the
regret is T/
√
s, similar to the case of the fixed price policy. To prove this, we consider
three different cases based on the range of p. When p > q, we can prove the expected
stopping time is too short so the total regret is Ω(T ). When p is smaller than q but
very close, we use Lemma 1 to prove the regret is T/
√
s. When p is small enough we
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can directly show the total regret is T/
√
s.
Comparing Lemma 4 with Lemma 2 we can see the extra flexibility in the adaptive
policy does not yield higher revenue or a lower regret. Given additional information
on the review at time s, the seller is still facing a regret of Ω(T/(log T
√
s)). The next
theorem proves that a fixed two-price adaptive policy still has the Ω(T 2/3) regret.
Theorem 5. For any partially adaptive two-price policy pit1,p1, RT (pit1,p1) = Ω(T
2/3/ log T ).
Before stating the main proof, we want to make some comments on the reason that
the adaptive policy has the same order of regret as the regret of the fixed price policy.
Consider the regret in the first period, when the seller decides the first price, the only
information he has is the initial review level q0 and t0, as well as the switching time t1.
This is the same information he has when determining the first price and switching time
in a fixed price policy. Therefore there is no advantage for the partially adaptive policy
in the first period. In the second period, the additional information at Gτ1 does not help
much. This is because from Lemma 3 the seller knows most of the trajectories of the
cumulative review stay between qs − √s log T and qs +√s log T . Therefore in a fixed
price policy, although the seller does not know the exact review level when switching the
price, he can still make a decision on the second price accordingly. On the other hand,
even the review is high at τ1, giving the seller some room to charge a higher price, he
still needs to make sure the price satisfies q − p = Ω(log Tt−1/2). Otherwise, the policy
is very likely to stop halfway.
Proof. We have a regret formula
RT (pit1,p1) = q(t1 − t0)− p1Eτ [τ1 − t0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+ q(T − t1)− EGτ1 [p∗2Eτ2 [τ2 − τ1|Gτ1 ]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
.
We first bound S1. We consider four possible cases.
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1. If p1 ≤ 0, then p1Eτ [(t1 − t0) ∧ (τ − t0)] ≤ 0, and S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0).
2. If p1 ≥ q0, then p1Eτ [(t1 − t0) ∧ (τ − t0)] = 0, and S1 = q(t1 − t0).
3. If 0 ≤ p1 ≤ min(q, q0), then by Lemma 1,
p1Eτ [(t1 − t0) ∧ (τ − t0)] ≤ q(t1 − t0)[1− exp(−2q0qt0/σ2)] + 4qq0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0,
and thus
S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0) exp(−2q0qt0/σ2)− 4qq0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0.
4. If q < p1 ≤ q0, then by Lemma 1,
p1Eτ [(t1 − t0) ∧ (τ − t0)] ≤ 4p1(q0 − p1)t0
σ
√
t1 − t0 ≤ q
2
0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0,
and
S1 ≥ q(t1 − t0)− q
2
0t0
σ
√
t1 − t0.
Therefore in all cases, S1 = Ω(t1).
Now consider the regret of S2.
• t1 > T 6/7
In this case, S1 = Ω(T
6/7).
Now consider the value of τ1. If τ
8/7
1 log T ≤ T − t1, from Lemma 4, we have
S2 = Ω(
T−t1√
τ1 log T
). And
S = S1 + S2 = Ω(T
6/7).
If τ
8/7
1 log T > T − t1, we have p2 ≤ Gτ1/τ1 = q + τ−1/21 log T .
S2 ≥ q(T − t1)− p2(T − t1) ≥ −τ−1/2+8/71 log T ≥ −T 9/14 log T,
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The last inequality is because τ1 ≤ T . Since 9/14 < 2/3, we also have
S = S1 + S2 = Ω(T
2/3).
• t1 ≤ T 2/3
In this case, from Lemma 4,
S2 = Ω(
T − t1√
t1 log T
).
Combining with S1 we have
RT (pit1,p1) = S1 + S2
≥ Ω(t1) + Ω
(
T − t1√
t1 log T
)
≥ c1(t1) + c2(T − t1)
2
√
t1
+
c2(T − t1)
2
√
t1
≥
[
c1c
2
2(T − t1)2
4
]1/3
= Ω(T 2/3).
Thus the theorem is proved.
3.3.2 Partially Adaptive Multi-Price Case
In this section, we extend our previous result of the partially adaptive policy to multiple
prices and show that a multi-price partially adaptive policy still has the same regret as
a fixed multi-price policy.
38
Theorem 6. For any partially adaptive multi-price policy piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1), we
have
RT (piT,K(t1, t2, . . . , tK−1; p1)) = Ω(T aK/ log T ),
where ak is defined in Theorem 4.
Proof. We prove this theorem by induction. We already show that forK = 2, RT (pit1,p1) =
Ω(T 2/3/ log T ). Suppose the result holds for K = k − 1, we now consider K = k.
To simplify the discussion, we use piT,k to refer to a general fixed price policy with
k price.
RT (piT,k) = qtk−1 − Jtk−1(piT,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+ q(T − tk−1)− pkEτk−1,τk [(τk − τk−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
.
For S1, by induction, we have
S1 = qtk−1 − Jtk−1(piT,k) = Ω(tak−1k−1 ).
Now consider the regret of S2. Let  = min{1− ak/ak−1, 2ak − 1}.
• tk−1 > T 1−
In this case, S1 = Ω(T
(1−)ak−1) = Ω(T ak).
Now consider the value of τk−1. If τ1+k−1 log T ≤ T − tk−1, from Lemma 4, we have
S2 = Ω(
T−tk−1√
τk−1 log T ). And
S = S1 + S2 = Ω(T
ak).
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If τ1+k−1 log T > T − tk−1, we have pk ≤ Gτk−1/τk−1 = q + τ−1/2k−1 log T .
S2 ≥ q(T − tk−1)− pk(T − tk−1) ≥ −τ1/2+k−1 log T ≥ −T 1/2+ log T.
We also have
S = S1 + S2 = Ω(T
ak),
since by definition of , ak > 1/2 + /2.
• tk−1 ≤ T 1−
In this case, from Lemma 4,
S2 = Ω(
T − tk−1√
tk−1 log T
).
Combining with S1 we have
RT (piT,k) = S1 + S2 ≥ Ω(tak−1k−1 ) + Ω
(
T − tk−1√
tk−1 log T
)
≥ c1tak−1k−1 +
2ak−1c2(T − tk−1)
2ak−1
√
tk−1 log T
≥
[
c1c
ak−1
2 (T − tk−1)2ak−1
22ak−1 log2ak T
]1/(2ak−1+1)
≥
[
c1c
ak−1
2
22ak−1
]1/(2ak−1+1)
(T − tk−1)2ak−1/(1+2ak−1) log−1 T
= Ω(T ak log−1 T ),
where the second inequality uses the fact that x + 2ak−1y ≥ (xy2ak−1)1/(2ak−1+1)
for all x, y ≥ 0, and that ak−1 ≤ 1. And the last inequality uses the fact that
tk−1 ≤ T 1−. Thus the theorem is proved.
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Theorem 6 states that, like in the two-price case, allowing adaptivity in multi-price
case does not help with the asymptotic regret either. In other words, it is enough to
consider a policy with fixed switching time and price to achieve asymptotic optimal
regret.
3.3.3 Fully Adaptive Two-Price Case
In the previous sessions, we consider the partially adaptive policy and show that the
policy has the same order of regret as the regret of the fixed price policy. A question
one may ask is, is there a better policy that can improve the regret? In this section, we
consider a policy with the even more flexibility, the fully adaptive two-price policy. In
a fully adaptive two-price policy, the seller only decides the first price p1. During the
entire sales horizon, the seller can pick any time to make a price switch. We use pip1 to
denote a fully adaptive two-price policy. The revenue and regret are defined by
JT (τp1) = E[qτ1 − p1τ1] + E[q(T − τ1)− p∗2(τ2 − τ1)]
RT (τp1) = q(T − t0)− JT (τp1),
where τ1 and τ2 are the stopping times for p1 and p2, determined by the seller’s policy
and the performance of Gt. We will show that the fully adaptive two-price policy also
has the same order of regret as the regret of the fixed two-price policy.
Theorem 7. For any fully adaptive two-price policy pip1, RT (pip1) = Ω(T
2/3/ log T ).
We first discuss the intuition why the fully adaptive two-price policy still has the
same order of regret. In the previous session, we argue that the review process Gt is
very likely between qt − √t log T and qt + √t log T at time t, therefore, the review qt
is between q − t−1/2 log T and q + t−1/2 log T at time t. As t grows larger, qt converges
to q. Because of this convergence, the additional flexibility does not help much. Even
41
though the seller could switch to any price at any time, he still needs to balance the
long term effect, that when qt converges to q, p2 ≤ qt.
Proof. Denote τ the stopping time for the first price.
• p1 ≤ q − log−1 T, τ ≥ T 3/4
In this case,
S1 = (q − p1)τ ≥ T 3/4/ log T.
We also have
S2 ≥ (q − p2)(T − τ) = −T 5/8 log T.
S1 + S2 = Ω(T
3/4/ log T ).
• p1 ≤ q − log−1 T, τ < T 3/4
In this case, the regret for the first period
S1 = (q − p1)τ ≥ τ log−1 T.
From Lemma 4, S2 = Ω((T − τ)/(
√
τ log T )). Therefore we have
S1 + S2 = τ log
−1 T + c
T − τ√
τ log T
= Ω
(
T 2/3
log T
)
.
• q − log−1 T < p1 ≤ q
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Since p1 ≤ q, we have S1 ≥ 0. From Lemma 7, we have
P(τ >
√
T )
=Φ
(
(q0 − p1)t0
σT 1/4
− q − p1
σ
T 1/4
)
− exp
(
−2(q0 − p1)(q − p1)t0
σ2
)
Φ
(
−(q0 − p1)t0
σT 1/4
+
q − p1
σ
T 1/4
)
.
≤ 1− exp
(
−2(q0 − p1)(q − p1)t0
σ2
)
+
2(q0 − p1)t0
T 1/4σ
≤ 1− exp
(
− 2q0t0
σ2 log T
)
+
2q0t0
T 1/4σ
= O(log−1 T ),
where the last equality is because 1− exp(−x) = O(x) when x goes 0. Similarly,
we have
P(τ > T 3/4)
=Φ
(
(q0 − p1)t0
σT 3/8
− q − p1
σ
T 3/8
)
− exp
(
−2(q0 − p1)(q − p1)t0
σ2
)
Φ
(
−(q0 − p1)t0
σT 3/8
+
q − p1
σ
T 3/8
)
.
≤ 1− exp
(
−2(q0 − p1)(q − p1)t0
σ2
)
+
2(q0 − p1)t0
T 3/8σ
≤ 1− exp
(
− 2q0t0
σ2 log T
)
+
2q0t0
T 3/8σ
= O(log−1 T ).
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S = S1 + S2
= E[(q − p1)τ + (q − p2)(T − τ)]
≥ P(τ ≤
√
T )[0 + Ω(T/(T 1/4 log T ))] + P(T 3/4 >= τ >
√
T )[0 + Ω(T/(T 3/8 log T ))]
+ P(T 3/4 < τ)[0 + τ−1/2 log T (T − τ)]
≥ (1− c1 log−1 T )[c2(T 3/4/ log T )] + c1 log−1 T [T 5/8 log T ]
= Ω(T 3/4/ log T ).
• p1 > q
From Lemma 7, we have
P(τ >
√
T ) ≤ 2(q0 − p1)t0
T 1/4σ
≤ 2q0t0
T 1/4σ
= O(T−1/4)
and
P(τ > T 3/4) ≤ 2(q0 − p1)t0
T 3/8σ
≤ 2q0t0
T 3/8σ
= O(T−3/8).
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Therefore we have
S = S1 + S2
= E[(q − p1)τ + (q − p2)(T − τ)]
≥ P(τ ≤
√
T )[−(q − q0)τ + Ω(T/(T 1/4 log T ))] + P(T 3/4 < τ)[−(q − q0)τ + τ−1/2 log T (T − τ)]
+ P(T 3/4 >= τ >
√
T )[−(q − q0)τ + Ω(T/(T 3/8 log T ))]
≥ (1− c2T−3/8)[−(q − q0)
√
T + Ω(T 3/4/ log T ))] + c2T
−3/8[−(q − q0)T 3/4 + Ω(T 5/8/ log T ))]
+ c2T
−3/8[−(q − q0)T − T 5/8 log T ]
= −(q − q0)
√
T + c3T
3/4/ log T + c2(q − q0)T 1/8 − c2c3T 3/8/ log T − c2(q − q0)T 3/8
+ c2c3T
1/4/ log T − (q − q0)c2T 5/8 − c2T 1/4 log T
= Ω(T 3/4/ log T )
where c2 and c3 are constants.
Combining all cases, we have that the regret is Ω(T 2/3/ log T ).
In this chapter, we introduce the basic model setting and discuss four types of
policies. For the fixed price policy, we provide some sample policies and prove their
regret. We also prove this is the best among fixed price policies. We then discuss some
adaptive policies and prove they have the same order of regret as the regret of the fixed
price policy.
Chapter 4
Discrete Model
In the last chapter, we discuss different policies and prove their regret bounds. However,
these results are all based on the assmuption that the review follows a normal distri-
bution. While in practice, most review systems require customers input discretized
rating. One may wonder if the underlying distribution changes, will the results remain
the same? In this section, we will address this question by considering a discrete model
where the customer review is a general distribution with expectation q and standard
devitation σ. We also require the distribution is bounded between [q, q¯]. Since q is now
a number between q and q¯, we also assume the prior knowledge q0 is between q and q¯.
Therefore we assume any price the seller could charge should also be in the same range.
Consider a customer comes at t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , T . Let Gt = q0t0 +
∑t
i=t0+1
Xi,
where Xi is the review given by the ith customer. Similar to the fixed two-price policy,
we use piDt1,p1,p2 to denote a fixed two-price policy in discrete time setting. The stopping
time also has a similar definition, τ1 = inf{t : Gt < p1t, t ≥ t0, t ∈ Z}, τ2 = inf{t : Gt <
p2t, t ≥ τ1, t ∈ Z}.
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The revenue of a discrete policy is
JT (pi
D
t1,p1,p2) = Eτ [p1(τ1 − t0) + p2(τ2 − τ1)].
The regret is
RT (pi
D
t1,p1,p2) = q(T − t0)− JT (piDt1,p1,p2).
In the following, we show that we can use the same fixed two-price policy with a similar
order of regret.
Theorem 8. Let t1 =
⌊
T 3/2
⌋
, p1 = q, p2 = q−log T/T 1/3. RT (piDt1,p1,p2) = O(T 2/3 log T ).
Based on the law of large number, as the number of review grows, the average review
rating qt converges to q. Therefore we can use a policy similar to Theorem 1. We first
use a low price to make sure the sales continue and at some time we switch to a high
price.
The proof uses Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the probability that qt devitates from
q.
Proof. In the following, we denote A1 = {τ1 < t1} and A2 = {τ2 < τ1 + T − t1}.
Therefore A1 ∪A2 = {τ2 < T}. And we have:
JT (pi
D
t1,p1,p2) ≥ qt1 + p2(T − t1) · P(τ2 = T )
= qt1 + p2(T − t1) · (1− P(A1 ∪A2))
qt1+ ≥ p2(T − t1) · (1− P(A1)− P(A2)).
Since p1 = 0 and Gt ≥ 0, we have P(A1) = 0. For P(A2),
47
P(A2) ≤
T∑
t=t1+1
P(Gt ≤ p2t)
=
T∑
t=t1+1
P
(
t∑
t1+1
Xi + q0t0 ≤ p2t
)
=
T∑
t=t1+1
P
(
t∑
t1+1
Xi/(t− t0) ≤ (p2t− q0t0)/(t− t0)
)
=
T∑
t=t1+1
P
(
t∑
t1+1
Xi/(t− t0) ≤ p2 − (q0 − p2)t0/(t− t0)
)
≤
T∑
t=t1+1
P
(
t∑
t1+1
Xi/(t− t0) ≤ q − T−1/3 log T +
(q − q¯)t0
t− t0
)
.
The last inequality comes from the fact that both p2 and q0 are between q and q¯.
From Hoeffding’s Inequality we have
P
(∑t
t1+1
Xi
(t− t0) ≤ q − T
−1/3 log T +
t0
t− t0
)
≤ exp
(
−2(t− t0)
(q¯ − q)2
(
T−1/3 log T − t0
t− t0
)2)
= exp
(−2(t− t0)
(q¯ − q)2
(
T−2/3 log2 T +
t20
(t− t0)2 − 2T
−1/3 log T
t0
(t− t0)
))
≤ exp
−2 log2 T − 2t20(t−t0) + 4t0T−1/3 log T
(q¯ − q)2
 ,
the last inequality is because t ≥ ⌊T 2/3⌋. The dominating term above is exp(−2 log2 T/(q¯−
q)) = T−2 log T/(q¯−q). Therefore,
P(A2) ≤ T · T−2 log T/(q¯−q) = T 1−2 log T/(q¯−q).
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Now we bound the regret,
RT (pit1,p1,p2) = q(T − t0)− JT (pit1,p1,p2)
≤ q(T − t0)− [p1(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1)(1− P(A1)− P(A2))]
= (q − p2)(T − t1) + (q − p1)(t1 − t0) + p2(T − t1)P(A2)− qt0
≤ (q − p2)(T − t1) + (q − q)(t1 − t0) + p2TP(A2)
≤ T 2/3 log T + q
⌊
T 2/3
⌋
+ qT 2−2 log T/(q¯−q).
We have RT (pit1,p1,p2) = O(T
2/3 log T ).
Next we show that for any partially adaptive two-price policy this is the best one
can do. Before proving the main theorem, we first show two lemmas.
The first lemma bounds the possible review level.
Lemma 5. The expected revenue of the trajectories in the set HD = {Gt|Gs > qs +
√
s log T, ∃s ∈ [0, T ]} is neglectable.
E[RD · 1(HD)] = O(1).
Proof. Since the price p is bounded by the upper limit of the review distribution q¯. We
only need to show that the probability that any trajectories cross the qs +
√
s log T
boundary is O(1).
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At any point s, the probability that Gs cross the boundary is
P(Gs > qs+
√
s log T ) = P
(
s∑
t0+1
Xi + q0t0 ≥ qs+
√
s log T
)
= P
(
s∑
t0+1
(Xi − q)/(s− t0) ≥ (qt0 − q0t0 +
√
s log T )/(s− t0)
)
.
From Hoeffding’s inequality we have
P(Gs > qs+
√
s log T ) ≤ exp
(
−2(s− t0)
2[(qt0 − q0t0 +
√
s log T )/(s− t0)]2
(s− t0)(q¯ − q)2
)
= exp
(
−2(qt0 − q0t0 +
√
s log T )2
(s− t0)(q¯ − q)2
)
= exp
(
−2(qt0 − q0t0)
2 + 4(qt0 − q0t0)
√
s log T + 2s log2 T
(s− t0)(q¯ − q)2
)
= O(T−2 log T/(q¯−q)
2
),
the last equality is because that the dominating term is 2s log2 T/[(s− t0)(q¯−q)2]. Now
we sum over s
∑
s
P(Gs > qs+
√
s log T ) = O(T 1−2 log T/(q¯−q)
2
) = O(1).
In the following discussion, we assume qs ≤ q+log T/
√
s. The second lemma bounds
the regret of the last price.
Lemma 6. Denote Gt = Gt = q0t0 +
∑t
i=t0+1
Xi, t > t0. Xi is an i.i.d. random
variable with range in [q, q¯]. Its expectation is q and its variance is σ. Let τp,s =
inf{t : Gt < pt, t ≥ s} ∧ (T − s) and S = q(T − s) − p∗Eτp∗,s [τp∗,s − s], where p∗ =
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argmax pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs]. If ∃, s ≤ T 1−,
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s log T
)
.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 9. For any partially adaptive two-price piDT (t1; p1), we have
RT (pi
D
T (t1; p1)) = Ω(T
2/3/ log T ).
Proof. The revenue of a partially adaptive two-price piDT (t1; p1) is
JT (pi
D
T (t1; p1)) = Eτ1,τ2 [p1(τ1 − t0) + maxp2 p2(τ2 − τ1)].
Therefore,
RT (pi
D
T (t1; p1)) =q(T − t0)− JT (piDT (t1; p1))
≥ q(t1 − t0)− p1Eτ1 [τ1 − t0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S1
+ q(T − t1)− Eτ1,τ2 [p∗2(τ2 − τ1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
.
We consider several cases
• t1 > T 2/3 From Lemma 6, we have
S1 = Ω
(
t1 − t0√
t0 log T
)
= Ω(t1/ log T ).
If τ1 > T
2/3, from Lemma 5 we have qτ1 ≤ q + log T/τ1. We can bound S2,
S2 ≥ q(T − t1)− qτ1(T − t1) ≥ − log T · (T − t1)/τ1 ≥ − log T · T 1/3.
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Combining S1 and S2, we have
S1 + S2 = Ω(t1/ log T )− T 1/3 log T = Ω(T 2/3/ log T ).
Next we discuss the range of τ1.
If τ1 ≤ T 2/3, and τ1.1 log T ≤ T − t1, we can apply Lemma 6 to bound S2. We
have
S2 = Ω
(
T − t1√
τ1 − t0 log T
)
= Ω
(
τ0.61
) ≥ 0.
Combining S1 and S2 we have
S1 + S2 ≥ Ω(t1/ log T ) = Ω(T 2/3/ log T ).
If τ1 ≤ T 2/3, and τ1.1 log T > T − t1, we have
S2 ≥ q(T − t1)− p(T − t1) ≥ (q − (q + log T/√τ1))(T − t1) ≥ −T 2/5 log3 T.
Combining S1 and S2 we have
S1 + S2 = Ω(t1/ log T )− T 2/5 log3 T = Ω(T 2/3/ log T ).
• t1 ≤ T 2/3 We first apply Lemma 6 to bound S1, we have
S1 = Ω
(
t1 − t0√
t0 log t1
)
= Ω (t1/ log t1) .
Then we use Lemma 4 again to bound S2, we have
S2 = Ω
(
T − t1√
t1 log T
)
.
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Combining S1 and S2, we have
S1 + S2 = Ω (t1/ log t1) + Ω
(
T − t1√
t1 log T
)
= Ω(T 2/3/ log T ).
To summarize, in this chapter, we consider a discrete model and a general reivew
distribution. We prove that under some mild assmuptions fixed two-price policy still
has O(T 2/3 log T ) regret. We also prove that any partially adaptive two-price policy
has at least Ω(T 2/3/ log T ) regret. Since the result does not require a specific review
distribution, it also answers the question we address in the introduction, that the review
system - no matter ‘like’ or ‘dislike’, or 5 stars, or 10 stars - does no have any impact
on the regret asymptotically.
Chapter 5
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct numerical experiments to test the performance of the fixed
price policy and the partially adaptive policy. By these numerical experiments, we aim
to address the following two questions in these two policies
• How each parameter (q, q0, t0, σ) influences the performance of the regret?
• How much benefit one can get from additional price changes?
Furthermore, we would like to test the performance of the fixed price policy in the
discrete model setting.
5.1 Fixed Price Policy
In this section, we test the performance of the fixed price policy proposed in Theorem
1 and Theorem 3. We start by introducing the setup of the experiments. In our
experiments, we consider a problem with q = 5, q0 = 5, σ = 2, t0 = 1 as the basic
model setting. And we let T grow from 10000 to 200000 by 10000 each time to draw
the regret-T curve.
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Next, we discuss how we conduct the simulation. We simulate sample paths of sales
and reviews given any policy. We discretize the time interval into t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , T .
In each time period, if the current review is higher than the current price, then the
customer will make a purchase. Otherwise there is no purchase at that time period.
When a customer purchases the product, the product also gets a new review generated
from a normal distribution with expectation q and standard deviation σ and the average
review updates accordingly.
In each of our simulated result, we run 10000 sample paths using the above method
and use the average revenue as the expected revenue the seller can earn for the corre-
sponding policy.
We first verify the asymptotic behavior of the regret. We plot the regret-T curve
for fixed price policy with 2, 3 and 4 prices. Figure 5.1 shows that as the number of
prices increases, the regret decreases. In the right figure of Figure 5.1, we also show the
relative regret, which is defined to be the regret divided by q(T − t0). As T increases,
we can see that the relative regret decreases. Furthermore, one may notice that as the
number of prices increases, the marginal benefit of having one more price to change
decreases. As in the figure, the difference between the fixed two-price policy and the
three-price policy is larger than the difference between the three-price policy and the
four-price policy. This observation is consistent with the theoretical results for the
multi-price policies. Recall that by Theorem 3 a k-price policy has a regret of Ω(T ak),
where ak =
1
2 +
1
2(2k−1) . As k →∞, the difference between ak and ak−1 decreases.
Next, we discuss the effect of q on the regret for the fixed price policy. Recall q is
the expectation of the review distribution. Figure 5.2 shows the regret-T curves of the
fixed two-price policy with q changing from 5 to 10 . It shows that increasing q will
increase the absolute regret, while decreasing the relative regret. The increase in the
absolute regret is because the regret is multiplied by a factor. And the decrease in the
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Figure 5.1: Fixed Price Policy, Regret-Time for different number of price used
relative regret is because of the fact that most of the regret is made in the first period
where p1 = − log T . And increasing q decreases the relative regret for the first period .
Figure 5.2: Fixed Price Policy, Regret-Time For Different q
Next we discuss the impact of t0 on the regret of fixed price policy. Recall t0 is
the initial number of reviews (with average review q0). Figure 5.3 shows the regret-T
curves of the fixed two-price policy with t0 changing from 1 to 100. It shows that as
t0 increases, the regret decreases. This is mainly because for a fixed T increasing t0
reduces the effective selling horizon, therefore reduce the total regret.
Next we consider the effect of σ on the regret of fixed price policy. Recall σ is the
standard deviation for the customers review distribution. Figure 5.4 shows the regret-T
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Figure 5.3: Fixed Price Policy, Regret-Time For Different t0
curves of the fixed two-price with σ increasing from 2 to 5. As shown in Figure 5.4,
when σ increases, the regret increases. This is because when σ increases, the review
distribution has a fatter tail and the review process has a higher probability falling
below pt. Although σ does not affect the asymptotic results as shown in Theorem 3, it
actually has a significant impact on the regret.
Figure 5.4: Fixed Price Policy, Regret-Time for Different σ
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5.2 Partially Adaptive Policy
In this section we show numerical test results of the partially adaptive policy. We first
illustrate how we implement the experiments.
We use backward induction to solve a dynamic programming. First we discretize
the time interval into t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , T . Denote Vt(ri|p) the expected revenue the
seller can earn for the rest of the time when the current review is ri, the current price
is p and the switching times are proposed in (2.3). Note that Vt(ri|p) is not the optimal
partially adaptive policy since the switching times are not optimal. When t is not a
switching time, we have if ri ≥ p,
Vt(ri|p) = p+
∑
j
pijVt+1(rj |p),
where pij is the probability the review becomes to rj at time t+ 1. If ri < p, we have
Vt(ri|p) = Vt(ri+1|p).
When t is a switching time, we have
Vt(ri|p) =
∑
j
pij max
p′
Vt+1(rj |p′).
And the boundary condition is
VT (ri|p) = 0,∀ri, p.
In the following experiments, without specification, the default parameters are: q = 5,
q0 = 5, t0 = 1, σ = 2. T is increased from 10000 to 200000 with an increment of 10000
each time.
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We first verify the regret growth for the partially adaptive policy. Figure 5.5 shows
the performance of the partially adaptive policy with a different number of prices.
Similar to the fixed price policy, as the number of price used increases, the regret
decreases. Also the relative regret decreases to 0, which means the partially adaptive
policy has a sublinear regret.
Figure 5.5: Adaptive Policy, Regret-Time For Different Number Of Price Used
Figure 5.6 shows the impact of q on adaptive policy. As q increases, the absolute
regret increases while the relative regret drops. Similar to the fixed price case, increasing
q makes the relative regret in the first period smaller, which leads to the overall smaller
regret through the horizon
Figure 5.6: Partially Adaptive Policy, Regret-Time, For Different q
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The next plot Figure 5.7 shows the impact of q0 on the regret. We find that increasing
q0 could decrease the regret of partially adaptive policy. This is mainly because the
partially adaptive policy could find the optimal price for different review level, which
could take advantage of a higher initial review q0.
Figure 5.7: Partially Adaptive Policy, Regret-Time, For Different q0
The next plot Figure 5.8 shows increasing t0 could reduce the regret. Compared
with the case in fixed price policy, we can see that the adaptive policy takes more
advantage of increasing t0. This is because in the partially adaptive policy, the price is
optimized based on the parameters. Therefore increasing t0 can make the seller price
more aggressively.
Figure 5.8: Partially Adaptive Policy, Regret-Time, For Different t0
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The next plot Figure 5.9 shows the impact of σ. To one’s surprise, increasing σ will
cause a huge increase in the regret for the partially adaptive policy compared with the
fixed adaptive policy. This result can be viewed similarly as Figure 5.8, that decreasing σ
can decrease the regret for the adaptive policy because the adaptive policy can optimize
the price based on the σ while fixed price policy is very conservative and does not take
full advantage when σ is small. Therefore increasing σ will have a bigger impact on the
partially adaptive policy.
Figure 5.9: Partially Adaptive Policy, Regret-Time, For Different σ
Figure 5.10 shows the second period optimal price used in the partially adaptive
policy. The optimal price increases as the review level increases.
Figure 5.10: Optimal Price Over Different Review Level
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5.3 Comparison with fully adaptive policy
Before moving to the discrete model section, we compare the performance of fixed two-
price policy, partially adaptive two-price policy and the fully adaptive two-price policy.
First we describe how we conduct the experiment. For the fully adaptive policy, we
use backward induction to calculate the expected revenue. Discretize the time interval
into t0 + 1, t0 + 2, . . . , T . We first calculate the revenue earned in the second period.
Denote V ′t (ri|p) the expected revenue the seller can earn for the rest of the time when
the current review is ri, the current price is p and the seller cannot switch to another
price. If ri ≥ p,
V ′t (ri|p) = p+
∑
j
pijV
′
t+1(rj |p),
where pij is the probability the review becomes to rj at time t+ 1. If ri < p,
V ′t (ri|p) = V ′t+1(ri|p).
The boundary condition is
V ′T (ri|p) = 0,∀ri, p.
Next we calculate the expected revenue before switching the price. Denote Vt(ri|p) the
expected revenue the seller can earn for the rest of the time when the current review is
ri, the current price is p and the seller is still able to switch to another price. We have
if ri ≥ p,
Vt(ri|p) = max(p+
∑
j
pijVt+1(rj |p),max
p′
V ′t (ri|p′)),
where pij is the probability the review becomes to rj at time t+ 1. If ri < p, we have
Vt(ri|p) = max
p′
V ′t (ri|p′).
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The boundary condition is
VT (ri|p) = 0,∀ri, p.
Figure 5.11 shows that the performance of partially adaptive policy is close to the
performance of fully adaptive policy. It means that being able to adaptively choose the
price is more important to the seller than being able to determine the switching time
adaptively.
Figure 5.11: Performance Comparison, Regret-Time
5.4 Discrete Model
In this section, we show the result for the discrete model, that a customer is coming at
t0+1, t0+2, . . . , T . In the previous two sections, the review follows a normal distribution.
In this section, we assume the review follows a binary distribution with the probability
of giving a good review q. The simulation is the same as the one in Section 5.1, except
that the review now follows a binary distribution.
And the basic model setting is q = 0.6, q0 = 0.6, t0 = 100 and T = 10000, 20000, . . . , 200000.
We use the policy proposed in Theorem 8. We also test a four-price policy modified
from Theorem 3.
We first verify the regret growth in the discrete model setting. Figure 5.12 shows the
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regret-T curve for fixed price policy with two prices and four prices. The relative regret
decreases to 0 as T increases. It means the previous result still holds for the discrete
model setting and with a binary review distribution.
Figure 5.12: Discrete Model, Regret-Time, for discrete policy with different number of
prices
Next we check the impact of q, which is the probability of giving a good review. We
draw three curves with q = 0.3, q = 0.6, q = 0.8 and the rest of the parameters are the
same with the basic model setting. Figure 5.13 shows that increasing q increases the
absolute regret but decreases the relative regret. This is consistent with the result we
have in Section 5.1.
Figure 5.13: Discrete Model, Regret-Time, for discrete policy with different q
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Next, we check the impact of t0, which is the initial review level. We draw two
curves with t0 = 10 and t0 = 100, and the rest of the parameters are the same with the
basic model setting. Figure 5.14 shows that increasing t0 slightly decreases the regret.
This is mainly because increases t0 reduces the total sales horizon when T is fixed.
Figure 5.14: Discrete Model, Regret-Time, for discrete policy with different t0
All the plots show that the performance of the fixed price policy in the discrete
model and a binary review distribution is similar to the performance of the fixed price
policy in the continuous model and a normal review distribution. This verifies that our
result can be applied to a general review distribution.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we consider a dynamic pricing problem when customers’ utility is
determined by both the price and the current review level. We first discuss a fixed two-
price policy, where both the price and the switching time are given at the start of the
sales horizon. We provide a policy and prove that it can achieve O(T 2/3 log T ) regret.
The policy is similar to what we observe in practice, in which the seller first gives a
discount, then switches to a higher price. We also prove that the Ω(T 2/3/ log T ) regret
is the best one can do for any two price fixed price policy. After that, we extend the
result to fixed multi-price policy. By increasing the number of prices to use, the seller
can achieve a better regret O(T ak log T ), where k is the number of prices to use and ak
is a decreasing sequence converging to 1/2. We then prove that this regret is the best
the seller can get under any k price fixed price policy.
After that, we consider another type of policy — adaptive policy. For the partially
adaptive policy, the seller only needs to specify the switching time and the first price at
the beginning. We prove that the partially adaptive policy still has the same order of
regret, Ω(T 2/3/ log T ) for two-price and Ω(T ak/ log T ) for k price. The extra flexibility of
adaptively determining the price does not bring the seller any advantage asymptotically.
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We then consider the fully adaptive two-price policy, for which the seller only needs to
determine the first price at the beginning of the sales. The seller can decide when to
switch to the second price at any time, and the price is also determined by the seller
adaptively. We show that the fully adaptive two-price policy still has a Ω(T 2/3/ log T )
regret.
Finally, we consider a discrete model and the customer review is a general distri-
bution. We prove that our proposed policy can still achieve a O(T 2/3 log T ) regret
and this is also asymptotic optimal. Therefore the asymptotic optimal performance is
independent of the distribution of the customer review.
Finally, we comment that although our results are all based on a simple utility
function u = q − p, the results in this dissertation can be extended to general utility
functions. To briefly discuss this, consider a general utility function u(q, p). Assume
u(q, p) is strictly increasing on q and strictly decreasing on p. We also assume that for
any q, there exists p such that u(q, p) = 0. Denote f(q) that u(q, f(q)) = 0. It is easy
to see the for a given q, f(q) is unique. Under this setting, if the customers know the
true quality of the product, the seller can set a price p = f(q) and his revenue will be
f(q)(T − t0). Therefore we define the regret in this setting by
RT (pi) = f(q)(T − t0)− JT (pi).
We can modify our proposed policy, by letting p1 = f(− log T ), t1 = T 2/3 and p2 =
f(q− log T/T 1/3). If f is a L-Lipschitz continuous function then we can prove that the
regret of the modified policy is still O(T 2/3 log T ). The proof is similar to the proof of
Theorem 1 with an additional argument that
f(q)− f(q − log T/T 1/3) ≤ L · log T/T 1/3.
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Therefore our work extends to the general utility function setting. Lastly, we list some
future research directions for this work:
• A fully adaptive policy with multiple prices. We can extend the fully adaptive
two-price policy to multi-price setting. In the fully adaptive multi-price setting,
the seller can switch to up to K prices. Only the first price is predetermined. The
rest K − 1 prices and all the switching times are determined adaptively.
• Customer review based on both the valuation of the product and the price of
the product. Our model assumes that the review rt is drawn from a normal
distribution N(q, σ2) that does not depend on the price. One can consider a new
model that the review is depending on both the valuation and the price charged,
for example, rt is drawn from N(q − pt, σ2), where pt is the price paid by the tth
customer.
• Utility functions that include the number of purchases. Right now the utility
function only depends on the average review and the price. One can consider the
case that customers are risk averse and their utility functions are also negatively
correlated with the estimated variance of the reviews.
• Customer arrival rate depending on the price. For example, we can consider a
model where customer arrival rate is a Poisson Process with rate λ(p), where p is
the current price.
• Customers are heterogeneous. In this model, we assume customers are homo-
geneous. We can consider the case where there are two types of customers, for
example, high valuation low price sensitivity and low valuation high price sensi-
tivity. The seller may want to use a high price to select high valuation customers
and keep the review high.
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• The quality of the product q is a variable controlled by the seller. In the current
model, we assume the quality is a fixed parameter. We can consider a model when
the seller can determine the quality of the product. A higher quality product has
a higher cost.
• There are multiple sellers in the market. In the current model, we consider only
one seller selling the product. We can extend this to multiple seller setting. The
customer’s purchase decision is based on the price and review of each seller’s
product.
• The quality of the product is not revealed to the seller. Currently in the model
we assume only the seller knows the true quality of the product. We can consider
a model that the seller does not know the true quality of the product, but has to
use customer’s review to infer the quality.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorems
Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. Let Bt be a standard Brownian motion. For a, b ≥ 0, the probability that Bt
goes beyond the line a+ bt is:
P(∪0≤t≤∞{Bt ≥ a+ bt}) = exp(−2ab).
Proof. This result is from [37]:
Proof of Lemma 8
Lemma 8. Let Bt be a standard Brownian motion. For a ≥ 0, the probability that Bt
goes beyond the line a+ bt is:
P(∪0≤t≤T {Bt ≥ a+ bt}) = 1− Φ(a/
√
T + b
√
T ) + exp(−2ab)Φ(−a/
√
T + b
√
T ). (0.1)
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Furthermore, let τ = inf{t : Bt ≥ a+ bt} ∧ T . Then
Eτ [τ ] ≤ [1− exp(−2ab)]+T + 4a ·min{1, exp(−2ab)}
√
T , (0.2)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}.
Proof. First, (0.1) follows from Proposition 2 in [37]. For (0.2), we have by (0.1),
E[τ ] =
∫ T
0
(
Φ(a/
√
t+ b
√
t)− exp(−2ab)Φ(−a/√t+ b√t)
)
dt.
When b ≥ 0, we have
Φ(a/
√
t+ b
√
t)− exp(−2ab)Φ(−a/√t+ b√t)
=(1− exp(−2ab))Φ(a/√t+ b√t) + exp(−2ab)[Φ(a/√t+ b√t)− Φ(−a/√t+ b√t)]
≤1− exp(−2ab) + 2a exp(−2ab)√
t
.
When b < 0, we have
Φ(a/
√
t+b
√
t)−exp(−2ab)Φ(−a/√t+b√t) ≤ Φ(a/√t+b√t)−Φ(−a/√t+b√t) ≤ 2a√
t
.
Combining the two different cases together, we have the result claimed in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. At time s, if we know the exact review level Gs, then we can view the second
period revenue as a new selling process starting from qˆ0 = y/s, tˆ0 = s. Conditioning
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Eτp,s [τp,s − s] on the realization of Gs, we have
pEτp,s [τp,s − s] = p
∫
y≥ps
Eτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]P(Gs = y)dy. (0.3)
1. The Price Is Higher Than The True Quality
If p > q, then by applying Lemma 1, we have for y ≥ ps,
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y] ≤
4p(y − ps)
σ
√
T − s.
Hence,
p
∫
y≥ps
Eτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]P(Gs = y)dy.
≤4p
σ
√
T − s
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
(y − ps)dy
=
4p
σ
√
T − s
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
(y − q(s− t0)− q0t0)dy
+
4p
σ
√
T − s
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
(q(s− t0) + q0t0 − ps)dy
=
4p
√
T − s√s− t0√
2pi
exp
(
−(ps− q(s− t0)− q0t0)
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
+
4p
σ
((q − p)(s− t0) + (q0 − p)t0)
√
T − s
(
1− Φ
(
ps− q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
))
≤4p
√
T − s√s− t0√
2pi
exp
(
−((p− q)(s− t0) + (p− q0)t0)
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
+
q20t0
σ
√
T − s.
Now we consider three possible cases.
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1. p > 2q + q0. In this case
p
√
s− t0 exp
(
−((p− q)(s− t0) + (p− q0)t0)
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
≤(p− q)√s− t0 exp
(
−(p− q)
2(s− t0)
2σ2
)
+ q
√
s− t0 exp
(
−q
2(s− t0)
2σ2
)
= O(1).
where the last equality is because x exp(−x2/2σ2) is uniformly bounded by a
constant. Thus in this case S ≥ q(T − s)−O(√T − s) = Ω(T − s).
2. p ≤ 2q + q0 and s < T 1−. In this case
4p
√
T − s√s− t0√
2pi
≤ 4(2q + q0)√
2pi
T 11/12.
Thus S = Ω(T ).
3. If q + T−(1/2−) < p ≤ 2q + q0 and s ≥ T 1−. In this case
p
√
s− t0 exp
(
−((p− q)(s− t0) + (p− q0)t0)
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
≤(2q + q0)T 1/2 exp
(
−T
 − t0
2σ2
+
2q(q + q0)t0
σ2
)
= O(1).
Thus S = Ω(T − s).
From 1, 3 we conclude that if p > q + T−(1/2−), s ≥ T 1−,
S = Ω(T − s).
From 1, 2 we conclude that if q ≤ p and s < T 1−,
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s− t0
)
.
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2. The Price Is Not Higher Than The True Quality And The switching time To Use
The Price Is Bounded.
When p ≤ q/2, S ≥ q(T − s)− p(T − s) ≥ q(T − s)/2 = Ω(T − s).
Next, we assume p > q/2. Applying Lemma 1, we have
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]
≤p(T − s)[1− exp(−2yq/σ2)] + 4p(y − ps)
σ
exp
(
−2(q − p)(y − ps)
σ2
)√
T − s.
Hence,
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]
=p
∫
y≥ps
P(Gs = y) · Eτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]dy
≤
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
·
[
p(T − s)− p(T − s) exp(−2yq/σ2) + 4p(y − ps)
σ
exp
(
−2(q − p)(y − ps)
σ2
)√
T − s
]
dy.
(0.4)
For the first term in (0.4), we have
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
p(T − s)dy
=p(T − s)
(
1− Φ
(
ps− q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
))
.
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For the second term in (0.4) , we have
− p(T − s)
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
exp
(−2yq
σ2
)
dy
=− p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)∫ ∞
ps
1√
2piσ
√
s− t0
exp
(
−(y − q0t0 + q(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
dy
=− p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
ps− q0t0 + q(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
.
For the third term in (0.4), we have
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
4p(y − ps)
σ
exp
(
−2(q − p)(y − ps)
σ2
)√
T − sdy
= exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
4p
√
T − s
σ
·
∫ ∞
ps
y − q0t0 + q(s− t0)− 2p(s− t0)√
2piσ
√
s− t0
exp
(
−(y − q0t0 − q(s− t0) + 2(q − p)(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
dy
+
4p((p− q)(s− t0) + (q0 − p)t0)
σ
√
T − s
∫
y≥ps
1
σ
√
s− t0
·φ
(
y − q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
exp
(
−2(q − p)(y − ps)
σ2
)
dy
≤ exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2p
√
T − s√s− t0√
pi
exp
(
−((p− q0)t0 + (q − p)(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
+
4p
σ
|q0 − p|t0
√
T − s.
≤ exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
−((p− q0)t0 + (q − p)(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
+
4p
σ
|q0 − p|t0
√
T − s,
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where the last inequality is because s ≤ T 1−. Now go back to the regret, we have
S ≥ q(T − s)− p(T − s)
(
1− Φ
(
ps− q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
))
+ p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
ps− q0t0 + q(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
− exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
−((p− q0)t0 + (q − p)(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
−4p
σ
|q0 − p|t0
√
T − s
≥ (q − p)(T − s) + p(T − s)Φ
(
ps− q(s− t0)− q0t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
+ p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
ps− q0t0 + q(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
− exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
−((p− q0)t0 + (q − p)(s− t0))
2
2σ2(s− t0)
)
−O(
√
T ).
Denote (q − p)√s− t0 = c, we have
S ≥ (q − p)(T − s) + p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
+ p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
ps− q0t0 + q(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
−O(
√
T )
− exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
.
We consider the following cases:
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1. c > log T . In this case,
exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
≤ exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
− log
2 T
2σ2
− (q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
≤ exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2p√
pi
exp
(
−(q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
T 1−/2−log T/(2σ
2) = O(1),
where the last equality is because p ≤ q. Thus,
S ≥ (q − p)(T − s)−O(
√
T ) ≥ log T · T − s√
s− t0 −O(
√
T ) = Ω
(
T − s√
s− t0
)
.
2. 1 < c ≤ log T . In this case, we have
p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
− |p− q0|t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
.
Let
x =
c
σ
+
|p− q0|t0
σ
√
s− t0 >
1
σ
.
We have
Φ(−x) ≥ 1
x+ 1/x
exp(−x2/2) for all x > 0.
Now since 1/x ≤ σ, and c < log T , we have
Φ
(
− c
σ
− |p− q0|t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ 1
log T/σ + |p− q0|qt0/σ + σ exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)|p− q0|t0
σ2
)
.
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Therefore when T is large (recall s ≤ T 1−),
p(T−s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ T 1−/4 exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)|p− q0|t0
σ2
)
.
Now we also have when p ≤ q,
exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
≤ exp
(
4q(q + q0)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2p√
pi
T 1−/2 exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)|p− q0|t0
σ2
)
.
Thus when T is large,
p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ exp
(
−2(q − p)(q0 − p)t0
σ2
)
2
√
2pT 1−/2√
pi
exp
(
− c
2
2σ2
− (p− q0)
2t20
2σ2(s− t0) −
(q − p)(p− q0)t0
σ2
)
.
Thus
S ≥ (q−p)(T −s)−O(
√
T ) ≥ T − s√
s− t0 −O(
√
T ) = Ω
(
T − s√
s− t0
)
, since s ≤ T 1−.
3. c ≤ 1, s > t0 + 1. In this case, we have
p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ p(T − s)Φ
(
− 1
σ
− |p− q0|t0
σ
)
.
Thus S ≥ p(T − s)Φ(−1/σ − |p− q0|t0/σ)−O(
√
T )−O(T 1−/2) = Ω(T ).
4. c ≤ 1, s ≤ t0 + 1, p > q0. In this case,
p(T − s)Φ
(
− c
σ
+
(p− q0)t0
σ
√
s− t0
)
≥ q0(T − s)Φ
(
− 1
σ
)
.
83
We have S ≥ q0(T − s)Φ(−1/σ)−O(
√
T )−O(T 1−/2) = Ω(T ).
5. c ≤ 1, s ≤ t0 + 1, p ≤ q0,
p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
ps− q0t0 + q(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
≥p(T − s) exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
(p+ q)(s− t0)
σ
√
s− t0
)]
≥q(T − s)
2
exp
(
−2qq0t0
σ2
)[
1− Φ
(
(q0 + q)
σ
)]
,
where the last inequality is because p ≥ q/2. We have
S ≥ q(T−s) exp (−2qq0t0/σ2) [1− Φ ((q0 + q)/σ)] /2−O(√T )−O(T 1−/2) = Ω(T ).
Combiningd with the discussion for the case p ≥ q, we have when s < T 1−,
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s− t0
)
.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Denote Hn = {Gt|argmax(Gt/t) ∈ [n, n+ 1)} ∩H. Hn is the set of trajectories
that achieves maximum Gt/t at the interval [n, n + 1). H =
∑
nHn. We bound the
revenue of a trajectory in H by maxt TGt/t. Therefore for Gt ∈ Hn, we can bound it
with maxt∈[n,n+1) TGt/t.
We first consider the probability that Gt > qt+m, t ∈ [n, n+ 1). Let y = Gn. We
have
P(Gt > qt+m|Gn = y) = 2Φ
(
−m+ qn− y
σ
)
.
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The expected revenue one can get when Gn = y is
E[max
TGt
t
|Gn = y]
≤T
n
∫ ∞
√
n log T
(qn+ q +m)
2
σ
φ
(
−qn+m− y
σ
)
dm
=
T
n
∫ ∞
√
n log T
(qn+m− y) 2
σ
φ
(
−qn+m− y
σ
)
dm+
T (y − q)
n
∫ ∞
√
n log T
2
σ
φ
(
−qn+m− y
σ
)
dm
=
σT
n
√
2pi
exp(−(qn+√n log T − y)2/(2σ2)) + 2T (y − q)
n
Φ
(
−qn+
√
n log T − y
σ
)
.
Now consider the distribution of Gn, we have
Ey[E[max
TGt
t
|Gn = y]]
≤ P(y ≤ qn+√n log T/2)E[maxTGt/t|Gn = qn+
√
n log T/2]
+
∫
y>qn+
√
n log T/2
E[maxTGt/t|Gn = y]dFy(y).
For the first term, we have
P(y ≤ qn+√n log T/2)E[maxTGt/t|Gn = qn+
√
n log T/2]
≤ σT
n
√
2pi
exp(−(√n log T/2)2/(2σ2)) + T (2qn+
√
n log T − 2q)
n
Φ
(
−
√
n log T/2
σ
)
≤ σT√
2pi
T−logT/(8σ
2) + T (q + log T − 2q/n) 2σ
log T
exp(− log2 T/(4σ2))
=
σT√
2pi
T−logT/(8σ
2) + T (q + log T − 2q/n) 2σ
log T
T−logT/(4σ
2)
≤T (3σ + 2σq)T−logT/(8σ2).
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For the second term, we have
∫
y>qn+
√
n log T/2
E[maxTGt/t|Gn = y]dFy(y)
≤
∫
y>qn+
√
n log T/2
σT + 2T (y − q)
n
1
σ
√
n− t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(n− t0)
σ
√
n− t0
)
dy
=
∫
y>qn+
√
n log T/2
2T (y − q0t0 − q(n− t0))
n
1
σ
√
n− t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(n− t0)
σ
√
n− t0
)
dy
+
∫
y>qn+
√
n log T/2
Tσ + 2T (q0t0 + q(n− t0 − 1))
n
1
σ
√
n− t0φ
(
y − q0t0 − q(n− t0)
σ
√
n− t0
)
dy
=
2Tσ
√
n− t0
n
exp
(
−(qn+
√
n log T/2− q0t0 − q(n− t0))2
2σ2(n− t0)
)
+
Tσ + 2T (q0t0 + q(n− t0 − 1))
n
Φ
(
−qn+
√
n log T/2− q0t0 − q(n− t0)
σ
√
n− t0
)
≤2Tσ
√
n− t0
n
exp
(
− log
2 T + 4(q − q0)t0 log T/
√
n
8σ2
)
+
Tσ + 2T (q0t0 + q(n− t0 − 1))
n
σ
√
n− t0
(q − t0)t0 +
√
n log T/2
exp
(
− log
2 T + 4(q − q0)t0 log T/
√
n
8σ2
)
Combining the two terms together, we know that the expected revenue for trajectories
at Hn is at the order of O(T
−logT/(8σ2)). Sum Hnthrough n = t0, t0 +1, · · · , T . We have
the expected revenue of trajectories at H has the same order, O(T−logT/(8σ2)). Notice
that if a trajectory Gt satisfies Gt ≤ qt+
√
n log T, ∀t ∈ [n, n+ 1), n = t0, t0 + 1, · · · , T ,
then it must satisfy Gt ≤ qt+
√
t log T, ∀t. Hence we complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From Lemma 3 we can only consider trajectories with Gt ≤ qt+
√
t log T . Denote
qs = Gs/s.
1. p > q and s < T 1−
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From Lemma 1, we have when p > q,
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y] ≤
4p(qs − p)s
σ
√
T − s.
Since we know Gs < qs+ s
1/2 log T and s < T 1−
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y] ≤
4ps1/2 log T
σ
√
T − s
≤4(qs
1/2 log T + log2 T )
σ
√
T − s
=O(T 1−/2 log T ).
Hence we have
S = Ω(T ).
2. q > p ≥ q − s−1/2 log−1 T and s ≤ T 1−
We have that
pEτp,s [τp,s − s|Gs = y]
≤ p (T − s)
[
1− exp
(
−2(qs − p)(q − p)s
σ2
)]
+
4p(qs − p)s
σ
exp
(
−2(qs − p)(q − p)s
σ2
)√
T − s
≤ q (T − s)
[
1− exp
(
− 4
σ2 log2 T
)]
+
4q
√
s
σ log T
√
T − s
≤ q (T − s)
[
1− exp
(
− 4
σ2 log T
)]
+
4qT 1−/2
σ log T
.
Hence
S = q(T − s)− q (T − s)
[
1− exp
(
− 4
σ2 log T
)]
− 4qT
1−/2
σ log T
= Ω(T ).
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5. p < q − s−1/2 log−1 T and s ≤ T 1−
In this case
S ≥ q(T − s)− (q − s−1/2 log−1 T )(T − s) = Ω( T − s√
s log T
).
Combining all the case together, we have S = Ω( T−s√
s log T
).
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. We consider the following cases.
• p > q + 1log T , s < T 1−
Consider the distribution of Gt at t = T
1−/2. If the stopping time τ < T 1−/2,
the revenue is bounded by pT 1−/2, if the process passes T 1−/2, it is bounded by
pT . We have
pE[τp,s − s] ≤ pT 1−/2P(GT 1−/2 < pT 1−/2) + pTP(GT 1−/2 ≥ pT 1−/2).
From Hoeffding’s inequality we have
P(GT 1−/2 ≥ pT 1−/2) ≤ exp
(
−2(T
1−/2 − s)2[p− q + (p− q0)s/(T 1−/2 − s)]2
(T 1−/2 − s)(q¯ − q)2
)
≤ exp
(
−2(T
1−/2 − s)[1/ log T + (p− q0)s/(T 1−/2 − s)]2
(q¯ − q)2
)
= O
(
exp
(
− 2T
1−/2
log2 T (q¯ − q)2
))
.
The probability of passing T 1− is very small, so the total revenue is bounded by
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O(T 1−/2). We have
S = q(T − s)−O(T 1−/2) = Ω(T ).
• q + 1log T > p ≥ q − 1√s log T , s ≤ T 1−
We consider the distribution of Gt at t = s log
2 T . With a similar argument in the
last case, we can bound the revenue by
pE[τp,s−s] ≤ p(s log2 T−s)P(Gs log2 T < ps log2 T )+p(T−s)P(Gs log2 T ≥ ps log2 T ).
To bound P(Gs log2 T ≥ ps log2 T ), we use Central Limit Theorem, []∣∣∣∣∣P
(
α ≤ 1√
nσ
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ β
)
−
∫ β
α
φ(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C√n,
where C is a constant determined by the distribution of Xi. We have
P(Gs log2 T ≥ ps log2 T ) = P
 1
σ
√
s log2 T − s
s log2 T∑
i=s+1
Xi ≥ ps log2 T − qss

= Φ
(
(qs − p)s+ (q − p)(s log2 T − s)
σ
√
s log2 T − s
)
+
C√
s log2 T − s
≤ Φ
 2 log T√s s+ 1√s log T (s log2 T − s)
σ
√
s log2 T − s
+ C√
s log2 T − s
≤ Φ
(
2 log T
σ
√
log2 T − 1
+
√
log2 T − 1
σ log T
)
+
C√
s log2 T − s
where qs = Gs/s is the review level at s and C is a constant. The second first
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inequality uses the result from Lemma 5 that qs ≤ q + log T/
√
s. As T →∞,
√
log2 T − 1
σ log T
→ 1, C
log T
→ 0,
therefore we can find a large enough T ′ so that ∀T > T ′,
Φ
(
2 log T
σ
√
log2 T − 1
+
√
log2 T − 1
σ log T
)
+
C√
s log2 T − s
≤ Φ
(
4
σ
)
.
Now we bound the regret
S = q(T − s)− pE[τp,s − s]
≥ q(T − s)− p(s log2 T − s)− p(T − s)Φ(4/σ)
≥ q(1− Φ(4/σ))(T − s)− Φ(4/σ)(T − s)/ log T − (q + 1
log T
)T 1− log2 T
= Ω(T − s).
• p < q − 1√
s log T
, s ≤ T 1−
Since the price is small enough we can bound the regret directly,
S ≥ q(T − s)− (q − 1√
s log T
)(T − s)
=
T − s√
s log T
.
Combining the above three cases we prove that for any price p, the regret is
S = Ω
(
T − s√
s log T
)
.
